• Information Warfare (IW) and Implications

• for the Digitized Battlefield

• by

• David Alexander

• Copyright (C) 1996 David Alexander. May be reprinted with copyright notice intact.

• Originally appeared in Military Technology Magazine

• Arriving at a definition of information warfare (IW) from U.S. defense establishment sources has something of the flavor of asking the blind man grasping the tusk, tail, foot or trunk of the elephant to describe the animal of which he is holding a piece.

• How IW will relate to emerging military doctrine, or if it can even be viewed in purely military terms, is as yet an open question, nor is there currently a coherent national U.S. IW policy; nor, for that matter, a firm consensus on precisely what IW should be called; "command and control warfare (C²W)," "information operations (IO)," "fifth dimension of warfare," "knowledge-based warfare" and "digitization" have all been variously proposed, and to some extent adopted, by different service branches.¹

• ^{Be that as it may, most descriptions of information warfare share characteristics of USAF's working definition of IW as "any action to deny, exploit, corrupt or destroy the enemy's information and its function as well as protecting against those actions and exploiting friendly information operations."}

• ^{Under this heading, USAF further proposes dividing IW into three basic missions: Counterinformation, or the control and exploitation of the information environment while safeguarding friendly information operations from attack; C2 attack, the exploitation of information as an offensive weapon and information operations, the overall enhancement of force effectiveness by gathering and utilizing knowledge from a variety of global sources.}

^{Information warfare further enshrines the subordinate concept of information dominance. In order to exploit the information environment advantageously, dominance in the information sector must be attained. Opposition forces' information resources must be suppressed while those of friendly assets protected, enabling information attack operations in the new "digitized battlefield" of the 21st century envisioned by Pentagon warplanners.}

• ^{Here again, two associated concepts are part of contemporary U.S. military thinking: global presence and virtual battlespace.}

• ^{The former, according to a recent USAF white paper, incorporates both physical presence and IW, with a concomitant capability to create, disseminate, access and manipulate information for friendly purposes while controlling informational flow to opposition forces to win a decisive advantage.}

• ^{The latter, according to the same study, would utilize IW assets comprised of computers, information networks, land- and space-based sensor arrays and other information system products to replace a physical military presence in a given operational sector. Driving the virtual battlespace concept is the diversification of threats and force size reductions due to budgetary constraints which diminish U.S. force deployment globally. The USAF study notes that "on occasion information alone may be enough to attain U.S. [military] objectives" and, it might be added, serve as a force multiplier.}

• ^{One highly placed military source has even gone so far as to attest that emerging trends in global warfare no longer concern land, but information (which would doubtless prove small comfort to residents of the former Yugoslavia, among other places), and that a revolution in military affairs, or RMA, is in fact taking place as a result of both geopolitical realities and the emergence of digitized battlefield systems and doctrines.}

• ^{By way of further clarification, information warfare can also be envisioned as having two distinct operational components: defensive and offensive. While self-evident distinctions, these aspects of IW are a current focus of doctrinal debate within the U.S. military establishment, intelligence community and high-echelon political circles including the current presidential administration. The U.S. Defense Department (DOD) in conjunction with Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) supports a defensive IW posture.}

• ^{ARPA's Defensive Information Warfare project is one of seven major research areas under the aegis of CSTO (Computing Systems Technology Office), and is cited as an array of "advanced security technologies to protect DOD's mission-critical capabilities against electronic attack upon or through their supporting computing infrastructure." These include tools for network security, secure computing systems, assurance and integration schemes, and methods to insure survivability of a vulnerable information infrastructure (or "infostructure") under enemy attack.}

• ^{A number of studies, however, have questioned whether a purely defensive IW stance is acceptable. Both the U.S. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Director of Central Intelligence are currently preparing a comprehensive report on IW. The collaborative classified report is scheduled to be completed by December, 1995.}

• ^{Additionally, the Pentagon has made the following recommendations vis-a-vis IW:}

• ^{Establishment of a single integrated operations plan (SIOP) for IW to countervail against an aggressor's IW capability.}

^{Establishment of a Battlefield Information Task Force to create and use joint battlespace modeling and simulation technologies for training exercises.}

• ^{Development of ACTDs toward optimizing and expanding extant capabilities and to exploit science and technology based programs.2}

• ^{Development of a direct broadcast satellite system for the warfighter.}

• ^{Expansion of U.S. training exercises and simulation and modeling in C4I including "virtual warfare" without the need for dedicated modeling and simulation centers.}

• ^{Conducting an in-depth assessment by DOD toward development of IW plans and policies. Such a study would include the vulnerabilities and capabilities of adversarial forces.}

^{The support by the US SECDEF of immediate funding increases for defensive IW, emphasizing protection of critical services and the establishment of special Red Teams to evaluate IW readiness and vulnerabilities.}

^{While information mastery is key to success in digitized battlespace, information warfare also translates into real-world systems. Key enablers for an information-based combat environment are space-based sensor arrays. Such systems drive technological R&D behind DOD-ARPA's WARBREAKER program,3 focusing on ACTDs in support of an integrated, end-to-end battle management system to enable worldwide, accurate, synchronized prosecution of time critical targets (TCTs) such as tactical ballistic missile (TBM) launchers (otherwise known as TELs, "sperm whales" or "hasholas" for Russian speakers) which proved so vexing to the "Scud Hunters" of Operation Desert Storm.}

• ^{Advanced unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems, advanced multimedia communications such as global-mobile (GLOMO) which would utilize next-generation information appliances ("infopliances"); robotic countermines, wide area ground surveillance systems and fire-and-forget standoff weapons under the Pentagon's Advanced Land Systems (ALS) project, and synthetic theaters of war such as SIMITAR and WARSIM 2000 for distributed training, are other applications associated with IW technologies.}

• ^{VIRUSES AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (GII)}

• ^{As might be supposed, the primary weapon in information warfare is information itself. Thus, linked to the subject of information warfare, as Nemesis to Greek tragedy, are what have come to be known generically as computer viruses; of these, two primary types have been cited; boot sector and executable file viruses.4}
  • ^{Boot sector viruses account for only about 500 viral strains, or less than ten percent of some 7,500 known viruses. Nevertheless, they are responsible for more than ninety percent of all infections, according to data released by the U.S.-based National Computer Security Association. Of the estimated one million host computers making up the global Internet -- the main component of the global information infrastructure (GII) or global "information superhighway" now under development -- statistics indicate that at least fifty percent have sustained viral incursions. Viruses are now being written at such a rapid rate that their number is said to double every eight-and-a-half months.}
  • ^{Viral incursions on the Internet are inevitable given the nature of the Internet Protocol (IP), the set of common hardware and software standards enabling the transmission of data across the linked network of computer nodes comprising the subnetworks of Internet "backbones." IP packets are not currently encrypted, thus easy game for computer hackers. So-called "sniffer" programs which can capture IP packets en bloc enable hackers to extract user passwords, providing access to restricted accounts. Once inside the system it is a simple matter to infect it with a virus by a variety of means.}
  • ^{Several recent cases can shed additional light on the role of viruses and the nature of those who create and disseminate them. In England, a hacker known as Black Baron recently pled guilty to writing the infamous SMEG/Pathogen and SMEG/Queeg viruses which have been responsible for thousands of recorded infestations of Internet host computers worldwide. In 1993, another British virus coder and president of a group of virus writers called ARCV, was arrested in connection with telephone fraud charges. ARCV stood for "Association of Really Cruel Viruses."}
  • ^{Drawing attention more recently is Satan Bug, a viral program responsible for crashing U.S. Secret Service computer networks in 1993. Satan is interesting from a variety of standpoints, not least of which is its exploitation of eleven known security flaws in the Unix operating system, the OS most commonly running on Internet and military hosts, nor its user-friendly command interface, nor even its wide availability on Internet bulletin boards. What makes Satan unique among viral programs is its acceptance by many self-proclaimed guardians of the computing infrastructure as a valid tool in testing system security by means of deliberate infection.}
  • ^{In the U.S. defense establishment, ARPA -- which, it should be remembered, initially established the Internet as ARPANET, which in turn was created to deal with a nascent IW threat -- is leading efforts toward establishing Internet security technologies and protocols, including firewalls, a firewall being defined as an array of software and hardware security implementations. Under the aegis of the already cited Defensive Information Warfare project, encryption, access control, data authentication, and digital signature schemes are all R&D subjects. Secure enclave technologies are planned which will enable distributed users to interact as though behind a common security perimeter. Operating systems which can isolate suspect viral code and enforce locally-specified security policies would drive these distributed networks. The reusable microkernals of advanced programs would contain so called "high-assurance" or viral-resistant code modules.}
  • ^{For the immediate future, however, and until security technologies mature, the National and Global Information Infrastructures are highly vulnerable to infoattack, both from national warfare or intelligence bodies carrying out a governmentally sanctioned policy of information warfare, or conversely, from hackers acting from a variety of motivations. Furthermore, because military computer and telecommunications networks are tied to civilian infostructures, there is currently no significant distinction between these infostructures or their underlying technologies.}
  • ^{Accordingly, technological distinctions amongst potential adversarial forces also dissolve, and observers have likened the uncertain strategic landscape to that prevailing when nuclear weapons first appeared. Indeed, it has been suggested that the IW threat changes the very nature of how modern warfare and terrorism should be defined. In this new context, for example, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, dubbed a crime, might otherwise be viewed as a strategic attack on the U.S., since the WTC housed offices of government agencies, contained major telecommunications nodes and is a nerve center of the global marketplace.}
  • ^{Bombs, like viral software programs, are not the only means of attack on an infostructure, whether military or civilian. More exotic weapons using high-energy radiation have also been demonstrated. HERF or high energy radio frequency guns and EMP/T or electromagnetic pulse transformer bombs can also be used to disrupt computer systems. Nor does the method of attack even require a virus or other program. Hackers frequently engage in what are called "brute force" attacks, hammering system "front ends" with repeated control- or alt-key sequences, or force-feeding passwords to gain entrance to hidden links behind the user interface. Such attacks, while crude, are highly effective.}
  • ^{FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS}
  • ^{A U.S. Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield recently concluded that the United States is highly vulnerable to electronic information attack and must adopt methods to cope with the threat. It further suggested that an evolving strategy and capability to wage information warfare may be the most important facet of military operations since the introduction of stealth.}
  • ^{Also noted in the report was the vulnerability of the infosystems of potential adversaries to information attack and the accessibility to Third World nations of formidable off-the-shelf IW capability resulting from the commercial availability of advanced infotechnologies coupled with a correspondent lack of export controls. Summing up a general consensus in military circles regarding this trend at the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association's TechNet '95 conference in Washington D.C. last June, USAF Major General Ken Minihan stated, "You've got something forming here that's a new frontier. It's another dimension we're going to operate in." Or, put another way, IW dramatically changes accepted rules of engagement.}
  • ^{The implications of this Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) have not been lost on the U.S. defense establishment which is undertaking efforts to study and address the situation. While the White House is currently drafting a Presidential Review Directive on information warfare to address the lack of national IW policy, DOD and the CIA (as noted earlier) are also among the many agencies conducting reviews. However, each branch of the armed services has already integrated IW into doctrine and command and control to some degree.}
  • ^{USN calls its IW plan "Copernicus Forward: How the Navy and the Marine Corps Will Conduct Warfare in the Information Age." In developing Copernicus Forward, the Navy evaluated C4I strategies and architectures of other service branches. Copernicus is intended to serve as a definitive architecture and unifying strategy for joint C4I operations. USN's main priority regarding IW is to "keep the warfighter in the center."}
  • ^{Copernicus Forward defines IW as "the integrated use of operations, security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare and physical destruction to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy an adversary's C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions." USN will focus on both offensive and defensive IW. Included in the Copernicus vision is the Battlecube Information Exchange System, a conceptual, multidimensional area including subsurface, surface, air and space as warfare environments. It would provide users with a common tactical picture and connectivity to implement USN's "sensor to shooter" doctrine, focusing on improved weapons delivery, including surveillance and reconnaissance, acquisition and localization, combat ID, targeting, engagement and guidance and battle damage assessments.}

  ^{USAF calls its IW initiative "Superhighway 2000," and alternatively, the "Combat Information Transport System." It is intended to capitalize on information-based combat systems in order to bring combat forces into what the Army calls the "fifth dimension of warfare" in which rapid, global information exchange can leverage warfighting assets. Integration of infotechnologies to serve a warfighting need, rather than the technologies per se, drives USAF's effort in this sphere. USAF plans call for exploiting the extant Base Information Infrastructure (BII), which is the USAF portion of the larger Defense Information Infrastructure (DII), to enhance C4I capability.5 BII, which addresses USAF's base communication infrastructure, essential to expeditionary warfare capability, would provide imagery, graphics, video and other high-bandwidth throughput to all core USAF C2 facilities. USAF's ultimate aim is to make advanced modeling and simulation available at all force levels "from the National Command Center to the foxhole," according to Lt. General Carl O'Berry, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for C4I, who also calls IW "a key enabler for [USAF] and [DOD]."}

  • ^{With the advent of Force XXI, the US Army intends to redesign its forces and adapt operational concepts and doctrine to leverage infotechnology. The Army has designated a division at Fort Hood as a testbed for concepts and weapons to comprise Force XXI, the first reorganized and most modernized unit of what it terms the "21st Century Army." The concept stresses that the Force XXI soldier will be empowered, rather than encumbered, by infotechnology-oriented weapons systems, and likens information superiority to air superiority insofar as providing friendly forces with more information than the enemy enables them with the agility, mobility and killing power to prevail on the battlefield.}
  • ^{Stressed as a key system in the Force XXI scheme, is the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter, characterized by proponents as "more than just a helicopter," but "a 21st century weapon built with 21st century technology." Utilizing first-line avionics and computer systems, Comanche would optimally provide maneuver forces with integrated, high-definition terrain mapping and target identification far more advanced than available from the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior today. Mixed deployment of advanced UAVs and Comanches, linked by infotechnology, is also proposed. Comanche would guide the UAVs, extending the reach of both platforms. The end result would be to provide maneuver forces with situational awareness decisive enough so that relatively small forces could defeat more substantial combat formations.}
  • ^{As should be evident, information warfare represents a new paradigm in military thinking. Whether or not it does, as claimed by proponents, change the rules of combat to any significant degree, its revolutionary implications cannot be ignored by warplanners, and its full impact, including risks and opportunities, must be evaluated in light of current technological trends and developing geopolitical realities.}
  • ^{SIDEBAR: A COMPUTER VIRUS PRIMER}
  • ^{Though a common synonym for all hostile computer programs, a computer virus is most accurately defined as a self-replicating and potentially dangerous program. Viruses generally attack the boot sector (the first sector on a hard disk containing data needed to boot the system) and executable files. In boot sector attack --the most hazardous form -- the legal boot sector is rewritten to another sector flagged as bad or unusable while viral segments are stored in hidden files. Having booted the system using the legal boot sector, the virus takes over, implementing its hidden code. Morphologically, viruses encompass three distinct types of programs.}
  • ^{Trojan horse. A program hidden within a host program and triggered upon execution. The host program, also called a "front end," is often an innocuous or legitimate application which conceals the Trojan. When placed on a system within a viral host, Trojans can replicate and spread across networks.}
  • ^{Worm. A program that bores through system memory, obliterating or altering data. Delivered as part of a virus, worms can replicate with great speed. Such was the case with the now infamous Internet Virus.}
  • ^{Logic bomb. A program that embeds itself in an executable file to lie dormant until a specific event, often a date, triggers it, upon which it becomes active. The most benign of hostile programs -- since these often self-erase after activation -- logic bombs can spread havoc if combined with a virus. E-mail programs infected with viral code are known as letter bombs.}
  • ^{Combating viral incursions is today a major global industry. Highly effective antiviral software is commercially available (DOD has recently contracted with Norman Data Defense Systems to provide protection for Defense computers and interface with DISA, the Defense Information Systems Agency) and computer security firms specialize in protective measures for industry and government. ARPA too, is engaged in R&D to build antiviral prophylaxis into Internet firewalls. Lasting victory is doubtful, however, as viruses daily become more numerous and sophisticated and because the virus is only one weapon in the hackers' arsenal. Brute force attacks and the physical penetration of target sites using "social engineering" techniques, as well as high-energy weapons, ensure that computer security personnel have their work cut out for them.}
  • ^{ENDNOTES FOUND ON FOLLOWING PAGE}

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  ^{1 For consistency's sake, "information warfare" and/or "IW" will be used to denote the subject of this article throughout. The US Army uses the term "digitization," while USAF refers to the "fifth dimension of warfare."}

  ^{2 Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) projects from fifteen candidates, many of which embrace IW, are currently under consideration in line with this objective in the following areas: Semi-automated Imagery Intelligence Processing. Automating image processing utilizing software systems capable of scanning imagery and detecting changes over time, then flagging for analysis. Battlefield Awareness and Data Dissemination. To focus on the form and process of information flow between battlefield commanders, specifically Joint Task Force commanders. Ground-Ground and Air-Ground Combat Identification. The Pentagon's Joint Requirements Oversight Council seeks to leverage this effort to address fratricide. Navigation Warfare. To include systems and concepts aimed at denying aggressors the use of navigation information, including GPS, while assuring access to friendly forces. Counterproliferation. Toward development of improved counterforce capabilities to survey and strike storage and production facilities for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Counterproliferation would encompass pre- and post-strike surveillance operations toward improving reliability of BDAs, an acknowledged US performance deficit during the Gulf War.}

  ^{3 Undertaken by ASTO.}

  ^{4 See accompanying sidebar on viruses.}

^{5 This will be included in the FY 97 budget request and in future requests.}